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NOTES AND COMMENT
MUTUALITY OF REmEDY IN RESPECT TO ASSIGNMENT OF CON-

TRATS.-The legal interpretation of the effect of an assignment of a
contract is that it effects a transfer of the rights only, under a conTherefore
tract as distinguished from the duties under a contract.'

the other party to a contract has no rights against an assignee, as an
assignee acquires no contractual duties, but merely rights, which he
may enforce or not, as he chooses. If he chooses not to take the
benefit of the bargain he has bought, the suit by the other party must2
be directed against the assignor, the party with whom he contracted.
"A judgment requiring the assignee of the vendee to
perform at the suit of the vendor would operate as the
imposition of a new liability on the assignee, which would be
an act of oppression and injustice, unless the assignee had,
expressly or by implication, entered into a personal and binding
contract with the assignor, or with the vendor, to assume the
obligations of the assignor." 3
However, as an assignee takes the rights under a contract, he is
entitled to sue the other party to the contract. But in view of the
earlier interpretation of the doctrine of Mutuality of Remedy, the
right of an assignee to obtain specific relief in equity, has been the
subject of much discussion and variance of opinion and decision.
As Fry stated the doctrine, "the contract to be specifically enforced
must as a general rule be mutual-that is to say, such, that it might
at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the
parties against the other." 4
This interpretation was finally adopted in the early decisions of
the New York courts, but not without many conflicts. Chancellor
Kent in the early case of Benedict v. Lynch wrote: 5
"Though there are other cases in which an agreement has
nct been deemed within the Statute of Frauds, and a specific
performance has been decreed, when the contract was signed
only by the party sought to be charged-yet the contrary
opinion appears, from the most recent decisions to be now
prevailing."
In a later case in respect to the same point Chancellor Kent
stated his opinion to be, that a contract lacking the element of
'Williston, Contracts (1920) p. 756 et seq.
2 Schaffer v. Vandewater, 160 App. Div. 803, 145 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1st
Dept. 1914); Anderson v. New York, etc., R. Co., 132 App. Div. 183, 116 N.
Y. Supp..954 (1st Dept. 1909); New York Phonograph Co. v. Davega, 127
App. Div. 222, 111 N. Y. Supp. 363 (2nd Dept. 1908); Suydam v. Dunton, 84
Hun. 506, 32 N. Y. Supp. 333 (2nd Dept. 1895).
. Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159 (1928) at 162.
'Fry, Specific Performance (5th ed. 1910) at 231.
'1 John's Ch. 369 (N. Y. 1815).
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mutuality was unenforceable. 6 Hence, since the other party to a
contract has no remedy against an assignee, an assignee was not
entitled to specific performance against him. A series of cases
over a period of years ending with Levin v. Dietz 7 added to the
weight of opinion that mutuality at the inception of a contract
between the parties sued and suing was of the essence. In not a
few of these cases, however, the writings on the subject were
obiter dicta.
Then the pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction,
culminating in the epochal opinion of Judge Cardozo, in the case of
Epstein v. Gluckin: 8
"Later cases have made it clear that the decisions there
made (in the Wadick and Levin cases) will be closely confined
and not extended by analogy. If there ever was a rule that
mutuality of remedy existing, not merely at the time of the
decree, but at the time of the formation of the contract, is a
condition of equitable relief, it has been so qualified by exceptions that, viewed as a precept of general validity it has ceased
to be the rule today. What equity exacts today as a condition
of relief is the assurance that the decree if rendered will
operate without injustice or oppression either to the plaintiff
or to defendant."
It would be unjust for example if after performance under a
decree of equity the common law remedy of damages would be the
defendant's sole security for the performance of the plaintiff's side
of the contract. 10 This modern interpretation fully accomplishes
what the doctrine of mutuality of remedy seeks, and this without the
fetters and cumbersome results of the earlier interpretation, under
which the law recognized an assignee's rights and then declared them
to be unenforceable so far as specific relief was concerned.
However, there was one more step to be taken in the process of
establishing the mutuality doctrine in its modern dress and to clarify
Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484 (N. Y. 1817).
'Palmer v. Gould, 144 N. Y. 671, 39 N. E. 378 (1895) ; Stokes v. Stokes,
148 N. Y. 708, 43 N. E. 211 (1896) ; Mahaney v. Carr, 175 N. Y. 454, 67 N. E.
903 (1903) ; Ide v. Brown, 178 N. Y. 26, 70 N. E. 101 (1904) ; Wadick v. Mace,
191 N. Y. 1, 83 N. E. 571 (1908); Levin v. Dietz, 194 N. Y. 376, 87 N. E.
454 (1909).
8233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
'Catholic F. M. Society v. Aussani, 215 N. Y. 1, 109 N. E. 80 (1915);
Trustees of Hamilton College v. Roberts, 223 N. Y. 56, 119 N. E. 97 (1918) ;
Hoffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241, 38 N. E. 298 (1894); Waddle v. Cabana, 220
N. Y. 18, 114 N. E. 1054 (1917); Heald v. Orthand Hastings Co., 223 N. Y.
575, 135 N. E. 924 (1922); Stone, The Mu¢tuality Rule in New York, 16 Col.
L. Rev. 443.
"Ames, 3 Col. L. Rev. 1.
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its effect as thus interpreted. It is difficult to understand how the
decision in the Epstein case, wherein the assignee was plaintiff, could
be regarded as a basis upon which to rest the proposition that the vendor is to be permitted to sue the assignee of the vendee. Nevertheless,
there remained considerable doubt that the earlier application of the
mutuality doctrine was to be dispensed with so easily. Now that it
was held that the assignee could sue for specific performance, it was
contended, that since equity is equality the converse ought to be
true. Reciprocity ought to be permitted. The Appellate Division
held, therefore, that the vendor could compel specific performance
against the vendee's assignee." Upon reaching the Court of Appeals
this erroneous conception was corrected and the third party denied
performance against the assignee.' 2 It was pointed out that the
question in the Epstein case was wholly one of remedy rather than
right, and the extent of the holding in that case was that mutuality of
remedy is important only so far as its presence is necessary to attain
the ends of justice. No new rights were created by the Epstein
decision, the interpretation of the assignment of a contract still remains that an assignee does not assume the duties under an assigned
contract, but only succeeds to the rights thereunder. Because it was
adjudicated that no injustice is done if the assignee enforces his
rights, did not mean the burdening of him with duties not assumed,
and the creation of a new right in the vendor. Equity follows the
law and specific performance is a remedy predicated only upon the
existence of a legal right.13
E. P.W.

DAMAGES OR RENT?-Landlords early found it necessary to
provide some means of securing unto themselves the profit of their
position. The lease which evidences the agreement with the tenant
is, as such, merely an agreement for the use of the premises. Out of
that use a rent issues ' and so a priori when the use is terminated no
further rent can accrue. Even though the tenant has broken a condition of his tenancy, for example, the payment of rent, the landlord
if he re-enters and is repossessed of the estate terminates all his rights
under the lease except the right to collect arrears of rent. Therefore,

' H. & H. Corp. v. Broad Holding Corp., 204 App. Div. 569, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 763 (2nd Dept. 1923); Langel v. Betz, 224 App. Div. 266, 229 N. Y.

Supp. 712 (2nd Dept. 1928).

"Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159 (1928).
' Pomeroy's, Specific Performance (3rd ed. 1926) Sec. 52 et seq.
A right to a certain profit (something not before in esse whether in labor,
provisions or part of annual product, money, or other thing) issuing annually
or periodically out of lands and tenements corporeal in return for land that
passes-Gilbert, Rents, 9.

